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Abstract 
 
Due to the constant financial crises in recent years, regulatory authorities around 
the world have encouraged enterprises to strengthen their corporate governance and 
have advocated establishing the system of independent directors. This research 
investigates the relationship between independent directors’ social network and their 
compensation. Using data of the board network at listed financial companies during 
2013-2015 in Taiwan, this study quantifies the density of entire network relationship 
based on network centrality measures. We draw the universe network among the 
directors at finance companies publicly listed in Taiwan and statistically identify the 
clustering groups. The conclusion contends that: (1) political connections are important, 
as directors at innermost of whole network have political connections relating to 
government supervisory units, (2) companies compensate the independent directors 
who have higher network centrality more, (3) independent directors’ salaries are not 
sensitive to firms’ performance, and (4) firms with higher leverage and with board 
member having low portion of shares tend to compensate independent directors more. 
 
 
Key Words: Board Network; Corporate Governance; Independent Director; Network 
Centrality 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
  
Contents 
Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 1	
Chapter 2 Literature Review ...................................................................................... 3 
2.1 Independent Directors’ Value and Network ..................................................... 3	
2.2 Independent Directors’ Background ................................................................ 7 
2.3 Independent Directors’ Compensation ............................................................. 8 
Chapter 3 Methodology ............................................................................................. 12	
3.1 Sample and Sources of Data .......................................................................... 12	
3.2 Network Centrality of an Individual Independent Director ........................... 12 
3.3 Network Diagrams and Gaph Metrics ........................................................... 14 
Chapter 4 Empirical Analysis ................................................................................... 29 
4.1 Firm-Level Descriptive Statistics .................................................................. 29	
4.2 Regression Analysis ....................................................................................... 33	
4.3 Robustness Test .............................................................................................. 37	
Chapter 5 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 38 
References ................................................................................................................... 40 
Appendix ..................................................................................................................... 46 
Acknowledgement ...................................................................................................... 52	
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Sample Board Network ............................................................................... 7 
Figure 2. Board Social Network Based on Degree Centrality ................................ 15 
Figure 3. Board Social Network Based on Degree Centrality (Independent 
        Directors Highlighted) ............................................................................... 16 
Figure 4. Innermost Board Network on Degree Centrality ................................... 18 
Figure 5. Board Social Network Based on Eigenvector Centrality (Independent 
        Directors Highlighted) ............................................................................... 19 
Figure 6. Innermost Board Network on Eigenvector Centrality ........................... 20 
Figure 7a. Board Network on 34 Groups ................................................................. 23 
Figure 7b. Board Network on 34 Groups ................................................................ 24 
Figure 8. Innermost Board Network of Groups ...................................................... 25 
Figure 9. Distribution of Centrality ......................................................................... 27 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
  
List of Tables 
Table 1. Average Annual Compensation of Independent Directors ...................... 10 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Network Component .......................................... 26 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Centrality ............................................................. 26 
Table 4. Variable Definitions ..................................................................................... 30 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Variables .............................................................. 31 
Table 6. Pearson Correlation Matrix ....................................................................... 32 
Table 7. Regression Results ....................................................................................... 34 
Table A. Variable Definitions .................................................................................... 46 
Table 8. Robustness Test (Sum of Centrality Measure) .......................................... 50 
Table 9. Robustness Test (Return on Asset) ............................................................. 51 
 
Appendix 
Appendix A: Social Connection of Listed Financial Companies ........................... 46 
Appendix B: Modularity Measurement ................................................................... 49 
Appendix C: Robustness Test ................................................................................... 50 
 
 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Corporate governance has getting more attention after the occurrence of several 
corporate scandals in the 20th century, e.g., Enron scandal in the US, Societe Generale 
scandal in France, Olympus scandal in Japan, etc. These scandals were caused by not 
only the operational misconduct but also the mismanagement of the board of directors. 
Therefore, the issue of independent directors, as an important internal control 
mechanism, has raised to reform to improve the corporate governance. How 
independent directors can improve the value of the companies are based on following 
arguments. First, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Zahra and Pearce (1989) claim that, 
as an independent director is not fully affiliate with a company, his/her network can 
provide the external connection so that the company accesses better information, 
increase the cooperation opportunity, and reduce the asymmetric communication cost. 
Secondly, when companies hire experts with related reputable professions as 
independent directors, those experts have the motivation to maintain their reputation 
and exert their profession (Fama and Jensen, 1983), improving the companies’ 
performances. Finally, Gilson (1990) and Vafeas (1999) find that hiring independent 
directors who are also directors in other companies can increase their goodwill and 
enjoy acquisition premium. 
Observing the historical progress of the independent director system, this study 
expects what independence means independent directors should be independent from 
managerial groups and big shares holders when making the voting decisions. 
Independent directors hence get the compensation for their independent professional 
service. However, what is fair compensation for independent directors are left 
theoretically undiscussed. In real practice at Taiwan, Lin (2014) shows that more than 
85% independent directors are delegated by the board of directors, and their salary 
packages are generally determined by either board of directors or by the remuneration 
committees. 
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 2 
In Taiwan, since 2002, publicly listed companies are suggested by the government 
to set up remuneration committees to assist the board in developing a transparent 
procedure of setting fair compensation for members of companies, and they are also 
advised to recruit at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor on 
their boards.1 Not until January 2008, publicly listed companies with a capital of more 
than NT $50 billion are required to delegate at least two independent directors or at 
least one-fifth of the directors on the board to be independent. After 2010, this act was 
expanded to all publicly listed corporations. Therefore, after 2010 the remuneration 
committees decide the compensation and other financial rewards for executives and all 
directors on the board. 
In this paper, we are of particular interested in understanding the network structure 
of those finance elites. And we want to investigate if independent directors’ networks 
connection is relevant to their salary and what determines their compensations. Sections 
are organized as follows. Section 1 provides the background information about 
independent directors’ regulation in Taiwan. In section 2, this paper discusses previous 
literature and propose possible hypotheses. Then, in section 3, we illustrate our network 
approach and methodology. Section 4 demonstrate our empirical results and their 
analysis. Finally, we conclude in section 5. 
 
 
                                                
1  According to the rules, “Corporate governance best practice principles for TSEC/GTSM listed companies,” 
developed by Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC/TSE) and GreTai Securities Market (GTSM). 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Independent Directors’ Value and Network 
As general directors and independent directors of the board are vested with 
different functions, weak ties theory by Granovetter (1985) can be used to explain the 
role of independent directors. Using weak ties theory, this study argues that independent 
directors who are weakly connected inside the board could communicate more efficient 
outside and have comparative advantages in exchanging the information (Lin, 2002). 
To be more specific, owing to closed coworker relationship between inside directors 
and managers, their strong relationship commonly ends in information redundancy 
when management decision is made. Additionally, Adams and Ferreira (2007) suggest 
that, though information disclosure conflict issue between managers and board 
members, shareholders could prefer a dual board system (with the managerial board 
and supervisory board) to a sole board system if the monitoring and the advisory roles 
of the board are completely separated. They cite the finding by DeFond, Hann, and Hu 
(2005) who find out that market reacts positively only to the appointment of accounting 
financial experts who focus on the monitoring, as opposed to non-accounting financial 
experts or non-experts that managers would consult in other capacities. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) report that, as independent directors are outsiders of the 
company and most of them have their major occupation such as faculty members at 
academic institution, accountants, or lawyers, their economic independence and the 
motive of maintaining reputation allow them to make independent decision for 
corporate governance, lowering agency cost. Evidence by Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) 
who use United States data, shows that, following the death of an independent director, 
the firm’s stock price drops by almost 1 percent on average. 
Besides, the board network has been extensively investigated. Bertoni and Ran- 
done (2006) show that that the board interlocks among Italian listed firms increased 
from 1999 to 2004 and document that the central nodes in the network are large 
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 4 
financial institutions. This phenomenon also can be observed in Taiwan’s market. 
According to the database of Taiwan Economic Journal, in 2014 over 50% of listed 
companies had interlocking directors who were board members in multiple companies, 
and the number increased to around 80% in 2015. As a matter of fact, 55% of 
interlocking directors served as independent directors in 2014 and increased to 
approximately 68% in 2015, implying that the network of boards is becoming more 
constrained to a smaller group of people. There are two possible explanations. First, the 
conglomerate could delegate a general director in the parent company to serve as an 
independent director at one of its subsidiary companies, leading in a condensed network 
of boards. Second, the market could evolutionary eliminate those who are incapable of 
bridging information efficiently. If the first case happens, an interlocking independent 
director will not create much value for the essence of “independence” at weak-tie theory, 
and the company does not have the incentive to compensate them more. However, the 
second case strongly implies a company would pay higher to recruit independent 
directors with better networks for their bridging information ability. 
To measure the information bridging ability, this study applies the degree of 
centrality theory to quantify the network of general directors and independent directors 
at finance listed company in Taiwan. Generally, the higher centrality implies higher 
information bridging ability. In a networked universe, the nodes (vertices) are the 
directors and the edges represent the connections among the directors. If two directors 
have served on at least one common institution at the same time, they are connected. 
The sets of direct and indirect connections form a universal network of boards. The 
larger the degree centrality of a node the more links to other. In addition to measuring 
bridging ability, larger the degree centrality could also mean the better access to the 
resources and social capital. 
Larcker et al. (2013) apply this network measure to quantify the boardroom 
centrality and find firms central in the interlocking boardroom network earn superior 
risk-adjusted stock returns. Boyd et al. (2001) document that the CEO’s external 
directorate network is a marginally significant factor explaining CEO compensation 
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 5 
and firm diversification lower the relationship between CEO’s external network and 
his/her compensation. The results of Chen, Wang, and Lin’s (2014) research also 
indicates that board networks can help independent directors to restrain tunneling 
behavior by large shareholders which play a positive role in corporate governance. 
Lin (2002) suggests that social capital that embedded in the network strengthens 
the independent directors’ function of auditing in the board in four ways: first, these 
resources promote the information flow in the network and resources which somehow 
in the specific strategic position could enable one to obtain information that is 
inaccessibility; second, the network relationship with social resources could affect the 
managers of the organization; third, the social credential of an individual could be 
proved by social relationship in the network and it moreover represents an individual’s 
ability to obtain and absorb knowledge; last but not least, network relationship builds 
up the identity of an individual in a group therefore individuals in the network would 
be willing to share information and public permission would be provided when 
individuals request for some particular resources. Accordingly, we know the network 
of independent directors would go through numerous channels to influence corporate 
governance. And this paper not only investigates the network centrality but also studies 
the background related to independent directors’ channels. 
Cashmen et al., (2010) find that network relationship provides the board more 
employment opportunities, so independent directors who are in a more central position 
could exempt from managers’ intimidation threat and make independent decisions to 
restrict the malfeasance behavior. 
On the other hand, some studies suggest that directors who hold adjunct 
directorships can hurt firm performance. Namely, such independent directors might be 
too busy to monitor each firm adequately since interlocks reduce the time that directors 
can allocate to each firm. For instance, Ferris et al., (2003) argue that well-connected 
directors are more likely to be overcommitted and lack the time to scrutinize their 
business effectively which could increase agency problem and thus affect firm value 
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owing to low-quality performance. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) also find that the 
company with a busy board of directors who holds more than three directorships are 
correlated with a lower market to book ratio based on a sample of Forbes 500 companies 
from 1989 to 1995. 
Furthermore, Burt (1992) has done extensive work with structural holes theory, 
which proposes that an individual who acts as a mediator between two or more groups 
of people could gain important comparative advantages. Zaheer and Bell (2005) also 
point out that the company that has a higher network structure strengthens the internal 
capacity by constructing structural holes. Compared with the degree centrality, it can 
be found the firms in the network center position (relative more directive links than 
others) generally are also in the location of the structural holes (later in our innermost 
network, we also observe this phenomenon). Overall, weak tie theory, degree centrality 
theory, and structural holes theory in the field of social network all imply that the 
external network of independent directors can increase the value of the firms. 
Figure 1 below illustrates the board network of three firms. The figure shows that 
independent director A0 will certainly be influenced by his/her own attributes when 
making corporate governance decisions. For example, as an accounting professor, 
he/she will be an expert in the financial disclosure field. Meanwhile, because 
independent director A1 has the same background as A0, they may have the same 
corporate governance effect according to prior research (assuming their other attributes 
are the same). Independent director B1 in firm B has a legal background, and inside 
director C1 in firm C is an industry expert (we assume that firm B and firm C are in the 
same industry). Therefore, A0 can gain information and professional knowledge about 
the law and the industry when communicating with B1 and C1 respectively. However, 
A1 cannot obtain similar information and knowledge as A0 does. Hence, in firm A, A1 
has a more significant influence on corporate governance than A2 because of the 
embeddedness of the board network. 
 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 7 
Figure 1: Sample Board Network 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Independent Directors’ Background 
The study of human capital can be traced back to Mincer (1974) and Becker (1993). 
They stress the importance of the individual worker’s profile and explains the difference 
in wage which has been found on the labor market measured by differences in ability, 
skill, knowledge, and other characteristics. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) note that 
there is a positive impact of managerial experience on CEO pay. Schwalbach and 
Brenner (2001) moreover propose a strong relationship between directors’ 
compensation, managerial talent, and the company size in the case of German sample. 
Gray and Benson (2003) observe the significant effects of human capital on the 
compensation of executives in a sample of small business. Therefore, we expect that 
the human capital of independent directors would affect their compensation level. 
Treichler (1995) and Stuart (2003) suggest that characteristics of independent 
directors enable them to carry out not only a control role of the company but also one 
of strategic consultancy within the board. As Fama and Jensen (1983), from a human 
capital perspective, argue that the board with more reputable outsiders and with higher 
human capital level will be more effectively to monitor managers, better independent 
directors are expected to be compensated more for their value creation for firms. Given 
any firm’s misconduct behavior would jeopardize its independent directors’ reputation, 
independent directors will charge sufficient amount worthy of their dedication. 
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Therefore, highly qualified independent directors might demand the premium at this 
market. 
To figure out what specific independent directors’ backgrounds that might 
influence the performance of companies and then in advance to determine their 
compensation, Kenser (1988) emphasizes outside directors’ characteristics like ages 
and working experience. In terms of the gender issue, Bilimoria and Piderit’s (1994) 
study greatly conform Kenser’s research and confirm that, in the remuneration 
committee, male outsiders indeed had more chances than female outsiders to become 
one of the board members. In the research of Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), they 
report that the CEO prefers directors who have diversified characteristics. The related 
empirical studies are also investigated extensively in China. For example, Wang et al. 
(2006) address that if independent directors have good reputation, then they will bring 
the positive effect to corporate performance, but no evidence prove the significant 
correlation between independent directors’ working experience and companies’ 
performance. In order to deepen the understanding of the board relationship, Wei et al. 
(2007) conduct a research in backgrounds of independent directors and show that 
independent directors who have government or bank working experience could obtain 
more resources and provide information to the company. 
2.3 Independent Directors’ Compensation 
Providing proper incentives for independent directors has been a controversial 
issue in the research of corporate governance. They do need proper compensation to 
induce cautious and responsible independent monitoring function while they should be 
managerially independent as well from the companies. Researchers have expressed 
consideration that too much financial reward for independent directors may 
compromise their independence. On the contrary, if the compensation offered is too 
low, companies would have difficulties in finding qualified independent directors to 
take on the dedication and responsibility required by the position. In short, the 
independent directors’ compensation should be considered fair for their dedication of 
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independent working. However, there is still no precise formula for optimal 
independent directors’ compensation that could not imperil their independence. 
The Unified Code of Good Governance confines itself to recommending that the 
compensation of outside directors be that required to reward the dedication, 
qualification, and responsibility required by the position; but not so high as to 
compromise their independence. The EU recommendation at 30 April 2009, Article 4, 
on compensation schemes of listed companies also provides a series of principles for 
drawing up compensation schemes for directors. According to The Unified Code of 
Good Governance and The EU recommendation, two main suggestion are: (1) the 
compensation scheme for independent directors should foster the companies’ long-term 
sustainability, and (2) the compensation should also be tied to the results of the 
companies. That is to say, the variable part of independent directors’ wage must be 
linked in some way to financial or quantifiable performance criteria so as to guarantee 
that decisions made by independent directors are the most favorable for companies in 
the long term. 
An early development in the topic of outsiders’ compensation is the claim of 
Hempel and Fay (1994). They report that, using a sample of US corporations, 
compensation of outsiders is mainly correlated with board size and the number of 
meeting rather than company performance. In contrast, Boyd (1996) finds that firm 
profitability, firm size, resource wealth, and director shareholdings are significantly 
related to compensation of outsiders. Linn and Park (2005) document that 
compensation of independent directors is related to the companies’ investment 
opportunities. Namely, the companies with more investment opportunities compensate 
their independent directors more than those with more limited investment environment. 
Finally, Marchetti and Stefanelli (2009) investigate the relationship between the 
compensation of independent directors and their personal profile. Their results show 
companies compensate more to those who have the better public figure and are more 
widely known. 
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